When One Fall Creates Two Convictions: Bridgeworks, Menai Civil, and the Myth of “Not My Worker”

On 11 Nov 22, a formworker fell nearly 3.85 metres from a bridge abutment at a construction site in Huntley, New South Wales, while stripping formwork. The worker was positioned on the top of the southern abutment, using an extension ladder to attach wire chains between a 26-tonne excavator and form soldiers, and was not wearing a harness because the steel available for anchoring was on the opposite side of the abutment.

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The incident resulted in two separate prosecutions. Menai Civil Contractors Pty Ltd, the principal contractor, was convicted and fined $69,750 after pleading guilty to a Category 3 offence under ss 33 and 19(1) of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW). Bridgeworks (Aust) Pty Ltd, engaged to assist the principal contractor and involved in the formwork stripping task through workers supplied by Topdeck Formwork Services Pty Ltd, was later convicted and fined $150,000 after pleading guilty to a Category 2 offence under ss 32 and 19(1) of the same Act.

That distinction matters. Menai Civil was prosecuted for failing to comply with its health and safety duty. Bridgeworks was prosecuted for failing to comply with its duty in a way that exposed an individual to a risk of death or serious injury. Under the NSW WHS Act, a Category 2 offence requires proof that the failure exposed an individual to a risk of death or serious injury or illness, while a Category 3 offence requires proof of a duty and a failure to comply with that duty.

This is the case study value. One fall, one worksite, one worker, one task, two convictions, and two different duty holders held to account for their own part in the same failure. It is not duplication. It is concurrent duty in action, which is exactly how the model WHS framework is designed to work.

What happened at the workface

Bridgeworks had been engaged by Menai Civil to assist with bridge construction, and Bridgeworks engaged Topdeck to supply formworkers. The injured worker, Michael Bagnato, had about eight years of experience in construction and formwork, and had commenced working at the site around August 2022.

On the morning of the incident, Mr Bagnato signed onto both the Menai Civil and Bridgeworks toolbox meeting sheets. During the pre-start, the work discussed included removal of formwork from the southern abutment. Before lunch, the workers stripped one side of the abutment, and Menai Civil’s site supervisor observed that the work was proceeding in accordance with the SWMS, with Mr Bagnato working from a platform ladder.

After lunch, the method changed in practice. Mr Bagnato accessed the top of the southern abutment using an extension ladder, attached wire chains between the excavator and the form soldiers, loosened the main screws, then physically shook the formwork to separate it from the concrete. At about 1420h, once the formwork separated, he lost balance and fell from the abutment, suffering serious injuries including a compound fracture to his right lower leg and broken tibia and fibula.

That is the point where the case stops being a formwork story and becomes a systems story. The safe method had been observed in the morning, but the actual method changed in the afternoon. The danger was not hidden. It was at height, on a bridge abutment, during formwork stripping, involving mechanical lifting, access equipment, and a worker exposed to a fall.

Bridgeworks’ failure

Bridgeworks accepted that it could have taken reasonably practicable steps to eliminate or minimise the risk by implementing and enforcing a safe system of work for stripping formwork on abutments, including specifying that an elevated work platform or platform ladder was required to detach the formwork and connect the chains from the excavator, and by providing adequate supervision.

Bridgeworks had systems on paper. It had a Project Safety Plan, Project Quality Plan, Construction Method Statement, multiple SWMS, working at heights content, induction processes, toolbox talks, site supervision, and ISO 45001 certification. Its SWMS identified the risk of falling from height when removing formwork shutters and included controls such as using elevated work platforms encapsulated by barriers.

The Court still found the system failed. The intended method was for the worker to use the platform ladder, attach the slings or chains, and return to ground level. There was no requirement for the worker to access the top of the abutment or physically shake the formwork to separate it from the concrete.

That is the practical root cause. Bridgeworks did not have no system, it had a system that did not hold when the job moved from the planned method to the improvised method. The Court described the method adopted after lunch as a gross departure from acceptable procedure and plainly unsafe.

This is why “we had a SWMS” should never be allowed to become the end of the conversation. A SWMS is only useful if the work is actually being done that way. Otherwise it becomes a decorative artefact, usually filed somewhere between “training matrix” and “other things people pretend to read”.

Menai Civil’s failure

Menai Civil’s role was different. It was the principal contractor at the Huntley construction site. SafeWork NSW reported that the risk of a worker falling from height while stripping formwork was known to Menai Civil, and the Court found that Menai Civil had a duty to ensure its subcontractors were following safe systems of work.

SafeWork NSW stated that its failure to do so was inconsistent with a proactive or systematic approach to safety.

That is the principal contractor lesson. Menai Civil did not become safe because it had engaged Bridgeworks. Bridgeworks did not become solely responsible because it had engaged Topdeck. Topdeck supplying the worker did not remove the duties owed by either Menai Civil or Bridgeworks.

The principal contractor role carries control and influence over the site, coordination of work, sequencing, access, interaction between contractors, and verification that high-risk work is being performed under safe systems. In this case, Menai Civil was not prosecuted because it personally employed the injured worker. It was prosecuted because it had a WHS duty in relation to the work and failed to meet that duty.

That is the bit some project structures conveniently forget. Contracting out the work does not contract out the duty. It may change how the duty is discharged, but it does not make the duty disappear.

Shared duties, not shared excuses

The NSW WHS Act is blunt on this point. A duty cannot be transferred to another person. More than one person can concurrently have the same duty. Each duty holder must comply with that duty to the required standard, even if another duty holder has the same duty. Where more than one person has a duty for the same matter, each person retains responsibility and must discharge the duty to the extent they have capacity to influence and control the matter.

Section 46 also requires duty holders, so far as is reasonably practicable, to consult, cooperate and coordinate activities with all other duty holders who have a duty in relation to the same matter. Safe Work Australia explains the same practical obligation in plain terms, duty holders need to consult, exchange information, work out who is doing what, and coordinate controls so gaps are not left between businesses.

That is exactly why this incident produced multiple prosecutions. Bridgeworks had direct involvement in the work method, the formwork task, the supplied formworkers, and the supervision of its scope. Menai Civil had principal contractor influence and control over the site and a duty to ensure subcontractors were following safe systems of work. Both had duties. Both had control points. Both were convicted.

This is not theoretical WHS law. This is how multi-PCBU work actually fails. One party assumes the other is managing the detail. The other party assumes the first party is coordinating the site. The worker is left standing on an abutment with a method that no longer matches the plan.

The root cause

The root cause was a failure of workface control across a multi-PCBU arrangement. The risk was known, the task was foreseeable, the controls were available, and the work method had already been performed safely earlier in the day using a platform ladder. The failure occurred when the method changed and neither the direct task control nor the principal contractor oversight intercepted it before the fall.

There were contributing failures beneath that. The stripping methodology was not adequately detailed, the safe system was not enforced during the afternoon work phase, supervision did not detect or stop the changed method, and the principal contractor did not ensure that subcontractors were following safe systems of work.

This is the operational gap that matters. The danger did not arise because nobody knew falling from height was dangerous. The danger arose because the system did not maintain control over the job when the work deviated from the expected method.

The lessons

The first lesson is that principal contractor status is not a logo on the site gate. It is a control function. If subcontractors are performing high-risk construction work, the principal contractor needs to verify that the controls are understood, available, suitable, and being used at the workface.

The second lesson is that a contractor with direct task control must keep the method alive during execution. Bridgeworks had an intended method involving a platform ladder, but the worker accessed the top of the abutment and shook the formwork. The legal problem was not the absence of words in a folder, it was the failure to implement and enforce the safe method when it mattered.

The third lesson is that shared duties must be made operational. Section 46 consultation is not a polite chat before mobilisation. It needs to define who controls access equipment, who verifies the SWMS at the workface, who stops the job when the method changes, who supervises each phase, and how that is checked when the work moves from one side of the structure to another.

The fourth lesson is that experience is not a substitute for control. Mr Bagnato was experienced, and the Court considered that in assessing Bridgeworks’ culpability and supervision obligations. But the worker still fell. Competence assists a safe system, it does not replace one.

The fifth lesson is that high-risk work needs hold points. The change from one side of the abutment to the other, the decision to use an extension ladder, the absence of an EWP, the worker accessing the top edge, and the attachment of chains to formwork were all points where the job could have been paused and reset before the incident.

The Safety Jon view

This case should be pinned to every construction project that runs the usual pyramid of principal contractor, contractor, subcontractor, labour supply, and “don’t worry mate, they know what they’re doing”.

Menai Civil was fined $69,750 because, as principal contractor, it had a duty to ensure subcontractors were following safe systems of work. Bridgeworks was fined $150,000 because it failed to implement and enforce the safe system for the formwork stripping task and exposed the worker to a risk of death or serious injury.

That is not unfair duplication. That is the WHS Act doing what it is supposed to do.

The worker did not fall through a gap in legislation. He fell through a gap between duty holders, between documented method and actual method, between morning supervision and afternoon execution, between “we have a SWMS” and “the job is being done safely right now”.

A safe system of work is not owned by one company in a contract chain. It is built, checked, and maintained by every duty holder with influence and control over the work. When that does not happen, the site does not have shared safety. It has shared exposure, and eventually, shared prosecution.

Stay safe!