Engaging A Contractor Does Not Outsource Operational Control
- Safety Jon

- 6 days ago
- 7 min read
The CCTV footage lasts only seconds, but it captures the entire problem. External contractors are moving a coin blanking press weighing around three tonnes with a forklift when the press becomes unstable, falls from the forklift tines and narrowly misses a worker standing beside it.
The worker escapes, so the event becomes a near miss rather than a fatality. That distinction matters enormously to the worker, but it does not make the underlying failure less serious.
The footage should be watched by anyone who believes contractor engagement transfers the operational risk to the contractor. It does not, particularly where the host organisation specifies the work, controls the workplace, provides information or documentation, coordinates access and influences how the activity is undertaken.
The Royal Australian Mint Undertaking
The incident occurred at the Royal Australian Mint’s Canberra workplace in May 2019 while the press was being relocated from a ground-floor engineering workshop to basement storage. Comcare’s reasons for decision describe the press as weighing between 2.5 and four tonnes and record that it became unbalanced before falling onto the basement corridor floor.
Following a Comcare investigation, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions commenced proceedings against the Mint. The charges alleged that the Mint had failed to provide a safe system of work and safe working environment, and had failed to provide the contractor with an adequate Safe Work Method Statement for transporting the press.
Comcare’s decision material provides more operational detail. The regulator alleged that the Mint failed to conduct an adequate assessment of load stability, failed to implement a control that adequately addressed the risk of the press falling while it was moved, and failed to provide the contractor with an adequate Mint-prepared SWMS.
The prosecution was discontinued after Comcare accepted a WHS undertaking from the Mint. The undertaking was accepted on 16 Apr 26 and publicly announced by Comcare on 23 Jun 26. It is important to be precise here, because accepting an undertaking does not constitute an admission of guilt regarding the alleged contraventions.
The Mint has committed approximately $1.1 million over two years to workplace and industry safety initiatives. These include mobile plant and contractor-management guidance, an interactive public safety display, a safety culture program, frontline leadership development and a partnership with the Australian Institute of Health and
Safety aimed at reducing forklift and pedestrian incidents.
That is a substantial investment arising from a job that someone presumably considered manageable enough to perform with a forklift and a few people standing nearby.
Contractor Engagement Is Not Risk Transfer
The contractor may supply the forklift, operator, labour and specialist capability, but that does not automatically remove the engaging organisation from the safety equation. Under section 19(1) of the Commonwealth Work Health and Safety Act 2011, the primary duty extends to workers engaged or caused to be engaged by the PCBU and workers whose activities are influenced or directed by it while they are carrying out work in the business or undertaking.
The practical extent of each party’s responsibility depends on the work, the contractual arrangements and the influence or control each party can exercise. The contractor retains its own duties, while the engaging organisation must manage the parts of the risk that sit within its knowledge, authority and operational control.
This is where contractor-management systems often become detached from the work. Procurement confirms insurance, licences and generic safety documents, the contractor signs an induction, someone approves a SWMS, and the organisation considers the risk transferred.
None of those steps establishes that the particular load can be safely transported through the particular building, using the selected plant, along the proposed route, with adequate load restraint and without workers standing in the crush zone.
Contractor prequalification may establish that a business exists and has paperwork, but it does not prove that today’s method is safe.
The Footage Shows The Failure Of Operational Imagination
A three-tonne machine becoming unstable on forklift tines is not a minor deviation. Once stability is lost, a person standing next to the machine has no meaningful physical control over where it falls.
The footage shows a worker beside the press as it begins to move. Whether he was guiding, supporting or attempting to stabilise it, his position placed him directly within the area where the load could fall. Fortunately, his survival instincts kicked in and he got out of the way at the last second. Mature cultures and systems do not blame workers... they treat their involvement as the catalyst but not the cause.
That should have been prevented before the forklift moved. The work method should have addressed the press’s weight, dimensions, centre of gravity, available lifting points, forklift capacity, tine configuration, load support and restraint, travel route, floor condition, clearances and the separation of people from the load.
The question was not merely whether a forklift could lift the press. The question was whether the complete movement could be performed while maintaining stability and ensuring that no person was exposed to the load if the plan failed.
A suitable contractor should have been able to explain that method. The Mint, as the organisation engaging and hosting the activity, still needed enough assurance to determine that the method was credible and that the conditions required by the method were present before work commenced.
A SWMS Is Not A Substitute For A Method
The presence of a SWMS can create a false sense of control. The document may contain correct terminology while avoiding the decisions that actually govern the job.
Statements such as “use suitable plant”, “ensure load is secure”, “maintain exclusion zone” and “use a spotter” are not a transport or lifting method. They do not identify what suitable means, how stability will be achieved, where the exclusion zone begins or who has authority to stop the movement.
A useful SWMS must reflect the actual plant, load, route, people and work environment. It should describe the controls with enough specificity that a supervisor can verify whether the work is being performed as planned.
The Mint matter also demonstrates that supplying a SWMS to a contractor does not complete the duty. Where the engaging organisation prepares or provides the document, it takes an active role in describing the work and cannot sensibly treat implementation as someone else’s private concern.
The meaningful question is whether anyone confirmed that the press was stable and adequately supported before travel commenced. The next question is why a worker was permitted to remain beside a suspended or inadequately secured load.
Known Risks Still Require Management Direction
The same management problem appears in the recent NSW quad-bike judgment involving Wumbulgal Agriculture Pty Ltd. An experienced farmhand suffered a fatal head injury after the quad bike he was operating struck a mound, overturned and threw him onto the ground. He was not wearing a helmet, and the quad bike was not fitted with an operator protective device.
The organisation knew about the risks. It had operator manuals, helmets were available, and it had previously received government rebates for a helmet, an operator protective device and a side-by-side vehicle. An operator protective device purchased with rebate assistance had later been removed from one of its quad bikes for operational reasons.
Despite that knowledge and available equipment, helmet use was recommended rather than mandated for certain work. Workers were effectively allowed to decide whether conditions justified wearing one, and the court found no effective system for monitoring or enforcing the matters discussed during competency assessments.
The court’s reasoning was blunt. Experienced workers can become accustomed to unsafe practices or develop misplaced confidence, which is precisely why the WHS Act requires duty holders to identify and control risk rather than leaving critical safety decisions to individual workers.
The Mint and Wumbulgal matters involve different industries and different hazards, but the management failure is recognisable. The risk was known, information existed and controls were available, but management direction and field verification were insufficient.
At the Mint, the contractor relationship did not ensure that the press was moved using a stable and verified method. On the farm, experience and access to safety equipment did not produce a mandatory and enforced system.
Verification Must Occur Before The Load Moves
Contractor management should move beyond document collection and establish deliberate hold points. A high-risk plant movement should not commence until an accountable person has confirmed that the scope is understood, the plant and attachments are suitable, the load characteristics have been assessed, the route has been inspected and workers can remain outside the potential fall and crush zones.
That accountable person does not necessarily need to be the most technically skilled person involved. They do need enough authority and understanding to challenge an inadequate method and refuse permission to proceed when the critical controls cannot be demonstrated.
The verification must also continue once work starts. A method that was acceptable during planning may no longer be acceptable if different plant arrives, access changes, the load cannot be secured as expected or the proposed route introduces clearances and gradients that were not assessed.
A change to the work should trigger reassessment, not improvisation around a moving forklift. Heavy plant is particularly unsympathetic to administrative optimism.
The Contractor-Control Questions That Matter
Before a contractor begins hazardous work, management should be able to explain who owns the overall activity and who controls each critical risk. The organisation should know who approved the method, who verified the plant, who inspected the route and who will stop the work if the agreed conditions are not met.
Management should also be able to demonstrate that responsibilities have been coordinated rather than merely distributed across separate documents. Where two organisations share duties, gaps regularly appear at the boundary between what the contractor assumes the host has done and what the host assumes the contractor will manage.
The final verification needs to occur in the workplace. If the approved SWMS requires an exclusion zone, the zone should be visible and enforced. If the load requires restraint or engineered lifting points, they should be physically present. If the method requires a spotter or supervisor, that person should be at the work area and performing that function.
A signed document cannot compensate for an absent control.
The Safety Jon View
Engaging competent contractors is a legitimate and often necessary risk control. It provides specialist knowledge, equipment and experience that the engaging organisation may not possess internally.
What it does not provide is permission for management to stop asking questions. The engaging organisation must define the work, provide relevant information, coordinate overlapping duties and verify the controls that fall within its influence or direction.
The Mint footage is valuable because no reconstruction or technical animation is required. A three-tonne machine falls from a forklift while a worker stands beside it, and chance determines that the outcome is a near miss rather than a death.
The lesson is not that contractors cannot be trusted. The lesson is that contractor engagement must be actively managed as work, not administratively processed as purchasing.
Operational control follows what an organisation can influence, direct, approve or prevent. It does not disappear when the purchase order is issued.




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