A SWMS Is Not Self-Executing

A worker entered a demolition site with two feet and left without the toes and part of the forefoot of his left foot. The risk had been identified, the controls had been documented and the business had a Safe Work Method Statement (SWMS), but the controls described in that document were not operating when they were needed.

Photo by Frederick Shaw on Unsplash

On 02 Jul 26, the South Australian Employment Court convicted A. Haros Demolition Pty Ltd of a Category 2 offence under the Work Health and Safety Act 2012 (SA). The company received a $120,000 fine, reduced by 40 per cent to $72,000 because of its early guilty plea, and was also ordered to pay legal costs and a Victims of Crime Levy.

This was not a case in which the hazard was obscure or the required controls were technically complex. It was a case in which the system described on paper was not maintained in the field.

The Incident

The incident occurred on 15 Nov 23 during demolition work at a residential property on South Road in Thebarton. A worker was picking and sorting demolition debris while an excavator was operating nearby.

At approximately 1530h, the excavator bucket became caught on a tree root and swung towards the worker. The bucket struck his left foot, causing a severe crush injury that required the amputation of every toe and part of the forefoot.

SafeWork SA’s investigation found that the company had failed to adequately enforce several critical controls. These included maintaining an exclusion zone around the excavator, establishing an effective communication system between the worker and operator, and ensuring a spotter was present when people were working near operating mobile plant.

The company’s SWMS had already identified those controls. The failure was not a lack of paperwork, it was the failure to convert the documented requirements into reliable conditions at the workface.

A SWMS Is Not Self-Executing

A SWMS does not establish an exclusion zone merely because the words “exclusion zone” appear in a table. It does not provide a spotter, confirm communication arrangements or prevent workers entering the operating envelope of mobile plant.

Someone must physically establish the controls, verify they are functioning and intervene when conditions change. That responsibility cannot be discharged by completing a pre-start briefing and assuming the work will remain as planned for the rest of the shift.

Auxiliary Judge Hannon emphasised that an appropriate SWMS must be implemented and monitored every day and throughout the day. The judgment specifically addressed the need to confirm that the required human and other resources remain available so that the SWMS is as effective in practice as intended.

That qualification matters. A control dependent on a spotter is not available when the spotter has been reassigned, has left the area or is performing another task. A control dependent on communication is not available when the agreed signals are unclear, line of sight has been lost or workers and operators are making different assumptions.

The Pre-Start Is Only a Point-In-Time Check

Pre-start meetings are useful, but they record what was intended at the beginning of the work. They do not prove that the same arrangements remained in place three hours later.

Demolition and civil construction work fronts change as structures are removed, debris accumulates, access routes move and machinery is repositioned. Transport yards present the same problem when trucks arrive out of sequence, loading areas become congested, drivers leave designated waiting areas or pedestrians take a shorter route through an operating zone.

A control can be appropriate at 0700h and ineffective by 1000h. The question for supervisors is not simply whether the SWMS was signed, but whether the control environment still matches the assumptions on which the SWMS was based.

This requires active supervision rather than document administration. The supervisor must be able to identify when the work has departed from the agreed method and have sufficient authority to pause the task until the controls are restored.

Exclusion Zones Must Exist in the Physical Workplace

An exclusion zone must be understood, visible and enforceable. A vague instruction to “stay clear of the excavator” is not an exclusion zone because it leaves the boundary open to individual interpretation.

The required separation should be based on the operating envelope of the plant, foreseeable movement of attachments, visibility limitations, ground conditions and the potential for unexpected movement. In this incident, the bucket’s interaction with a tree root caused it to move towards the worker, demonstrating why the danger area cannot be limited to where the operator intends the bucket to travel.

Physical barriers should be used where reasonably practicable. Where barriers cannot be maintained because the work front is continually changing, the alternative arrangement requires greater supervisory attention, not less.

Workers must also know when the zone can be entered, who can authorise entry and how positive communication with the operator will be achieved. Entry should never depend on an assumption that the operator has seen the person approaching.

A Spotter Is a Control, Not Spare Labour

Businesses regularly describe a spotter as a required control and then treat that person as available labour once production pressure increases. The spotter is asked to move material, guide another vehicle, answer a phone call or assist elsewhere while the plant continues operating.

At that point, the control has been removed even though the SWMS has not changed. The paperwork continues to show that a spotter is present, while the actual work is being performed without one.

Where the safe system depends on a spotter, the task should stop when the spotter is unavailable. Continuing the work without the nominated control is an operational decision to accept a different risk profile from the one assessed and authorised.

This should not require debate at the workface. The stop-work trigger needs to be established before the job starts and supported by management when it affects productivity.

Supervisory Verification Must Be Deliberate

Supervisory verification should test the presence and effectiveness of critical controls rather than ask whether workers have completed the paperwork. A supervisor walking the site should be able to confirm where the exclusion zone begins, whether it remains suitable for the current plant position, who is acting as spotter and how communication with the operator is being maintained.

The verification also needs to consider whether the work has changed. New tasks, altered access, different plant, changed ground conditions, reduced visibility, absent personnel and competing activities should trigger a review of the SWMS and the work arrangements.

The frequency of verification should reflect the pace at which the work environment can change. A static workshop task may remain stable for an extended period, while demolition, civil works and busy transport yards may require repeated checks during the shift and whenever the work front moves.

A signature obtained at the morning pre-start does not demonstrate this occurred. Evidence should come from visible controls, supervisor observations, recorded hold points, task reassessments and timely correction when deviations are identified.

The Real Test of the System

The practical test is straightforward. Are the controls described in the SWMS physically present and functioning at the time the hazardous interaction occurs?

If the answer depends on what was discussed earlier, what normally happens or what workers were expected to remember, the system is already relying too heavily on administrative intent. Critical controls must survive routine disruption, changing work conditions and production pressure.

The A. Haros Demolition prosecution is not an argument for longer SWMS documents. Adding another page of generic instructions would not have protected the worker’s foot.

The lesson is that documented controls require operational ownership. Supervisors must verify them, workers must understand the limits they create, and management must provide the people, time and authority necessary to keep them in place.

A SWMS can describe the safe system, but it cannot execute it. That still requires people to manage the work that is actually happening, not the work that was expected to happen when the document was signed.