Desbo Industries Fined Over Fall Risk: The Problem Was Visible Before Anyone Hit the Ground
- Safety Jon

- 1 day ago
- 6 min read
A Victorian residential builder has been convicted and fined after WorkSafe found contractors working more than three metres above ground level without fall protection. Desbo Industries Pty Ltd was sentenced in the Geelong Magistrates’ Court on 05 Mar 26 after pleading guilty to failing to ensure a workplace under its management and control was safe and without risks to health. The company was fined $40,000 and ordered to pay $4,422 in costs.

The facts are not complex, which is exactly why this matter is useful. Desbo was the principal contractor for the construction of a two-storey residence in Grovedale.
In October 2024, a WorkSafe inspector attended the site after a report of unsafe work at height practices and observed two contractors installing flooring sheets on the first floor, more than three metres above ground, with no fall protection in place.
Access to the first floor was by an extension ladder placed in the stair void. WorkSafe also noted that there had been an incomplete attempt to create an exclusion zone using tape. That detail matters, because tape around a stair void is not a control for a fall from height, it is a visual suggestion wearing a hi-vis vest.
The investigation also found that Desbo had three prior interactions with WorkSafe between 2020 and 2024 about the risk of serious injury or death from falls greater than two metres due to inadequate fall protection or no fall protection. That history changes the tone of the matter. This was not a duty holder caught cold by an obscure technical requirement. It was a repeat exposure to a known construction risk.
Desbo accepted that it was reasonably practicable to reduce the risk by restricting access to the first floor until suitable and compliant perimeter guard railing was installed around the perimeter edge and stair void. That is the sentence every builder should sit with. The control was not novel, expensive, exotic, or dependent on an engineering PhD from the University of Common Sense. It was basic access restriction and compliant edge protection.
The risk was not theoretical.
Falls from height in residential construction remain one of those hazards where the language gets softened on site. People talk about “just getting it done,” “only being up there for a minute,” or “keeping an eye on it.” None of that survives contact with a courtroom, an inspector’s notebook, or a worker hitting concrete.
In this case, the work involved installing flooring sheets on the first floor. That creates exposure at open edges, penetrations, access points and stair voids. The fact that there was a stair void ladder and an attempted tape exclusion zone indicates the risk had been seen, recognised and partially responded to, but not properly controlled.
That is often where prosecution risk lives. It is not always a complete absence of thought. It can be a half-control, a temporary workaround, a site habit, or a “we’ll fix it later” condition that becomes normal enough for people to keep working around it.
The legal problem for Desbo...
The charge was framed around management and control of the workplace. As principal contractor, Desbo had a duty to ensure that the workplace, so far as reasonably practicable, was safe and without risks to health. WorkSafe’s release states that the company pleaded guilty to a single charge of failing to ensure the workplace under its management and control was safe and without risks to health.
The prosecution logic is straightforward. The hazard was an unprotected fall from height. The risk was serious injury or death. The work was proceeding at more than three metres. The controls were known, available and accepted as reasonably practicable. The duty holder also had prior WorkSafe interactions about the same class of risk.
That last part is the big red flag. Prior regulatory contact helps establish knowledge. Once a duty holder has been warned, advised, inspected or otherwise put on notice about a hazard category, the room for claiming surprise gets very small, very quickly.
What WorkSafe expected to see...
Through Inspector school, it was taught to us that our expectation is to ser higher order controls implemented. Hierarchy of risk conteol levels in safety speak are:
Level 1 = Elimination
Level 2 = Substitution, Isolation, Engineering
Level 3 = Administration, PPE
WorkSafe’s stated control position followed the hierarchy of controls for falls from height. The preferred approach is to eliminate the risk where practicable by doing work from the ground or a solid construction. If elimination is not practicable, passive fall prevention such as scaffolds, perimeter screens, guardrails, safety mesh or elevating work platforms should be used. Lower-order controls include positioning systems, fall arrest systems, ladders and administrative controls.
On this site, the practical control was clear. Do not allow access to the first floor until compliant perimeter guard railing is installed around both the perimeter edge and the stair void. That is a simple sequencing control, and sequencing is where residential builders either control risk properly or quietly build prosecution exhibits for the regulator.
The presence of an extension ladder in the stair void is another issue worth noting. Access systems must not introduce another fall risk while workers are being moved into the work area. A ladder in or near a void, combined with incomplete exclusion and no compliant edge protection, is not a controlled access arrangement. It is a collection of optimistic decisions leaning against gravity.
The subcontractor issue...
WorkSafe also stated that a subcontractor engaged to undertake carpentry work at the site had been charged and was next listed to face the Geelong Magistrates’ Court on 14 Apr 26. That matters because it shows the regulator is not treating the principal contractor arrangement as a magic shield for subcontractors, or treating subcontractor engagement as a magic shield for the principal contractor.
In practical terms, both parties can carry duties. The principal contractor controls site sequencing, site rules and access arrangements. The subcontractor controls its own work methods, worker direction and whether its people proceed in unsafe conditions.
Everyone loves contractual separation until the first inspector asks who let the work happen.
What other builders should take from this...
The first lesson is that fall protection needs to be physically in place before the work starts. A SWMS that says “install edge protection” does not control a live edge if workers are already standing beside it. Site documentation has value only when it matches the state of the job.
The second lesson is that tape is not guard railing. Tape may help mark an area, support communication or form part of a broader control set, but it does not prevent a worker falling through a stair void or over an exposed perimeter edge. Where the consequence is death or serious injury, the control needs to be capable of physically preventing the event, not merely warning people that gravity is still operating.
The third lesson is that regulator history follows you. If a company has repeated WorkSafe interactions about a known hazard, future failures will be viewed through that history. That does not mean a prosecution is automatic, but it makes the question sharper, what did you change after the earlier interactions?
Before every inspection, I would search the WorkSafe database for a complete history of interactions, inspections, notices, and the content of each, to give me an understanding of the Duty Holders attitude, state of knowledge, and any other relevant information.
Practical controls to close the gap...
Builders should be able to demonstrate that first-floor work cannot commence until edge protection and stair void protection are installed, inspected and signed off. That should be built into the construction sequence, not left to site discretion on the morning. The required control should be visible before materials are lifted, workers access the deck, or subcontractors begin installation.
The site file should include a current SWMS for high-risk construction work involving a risk of falling more than two metres, evidence of worker consultation, pre-start checks, photographs of installed controls, and a clear hold point before work at height begins. Supervisors should be required to verify the actual site condition, because paperwork signed in a ute does not stop a fall.
Where subcontractors are engaged, the principal contractor should verify that the subcontractor’s SWMS addresses the actual work area and the actual fall risks. A generic carpentry SWMS does not adequately address an unprotected first-floor deck, an open stair void, ladder access through a void and incomplete exclusion controls. That gap is not administrative. It is operational.
Safety Jon take
This prosecution is not about a complicated technical failure. It is about a known hazard, a visible exposure, a basic physical control and a duty holder with prior regulatory contact. That combination is exactly how a $40,000 fine becomes the cheaper outcome compared with what could have happened.
The practical question for builders is blunt. Could you stand on your site today, point to every open edge, void and access point, and show the physical control that prevents a fall?
If the answer is “we’ve told the boys to be careful,” congratulations, you have discovered hope-based risk management, the official building material of prosecutions.
Another way to frame things is to put "your honour" at the end of your answers to see if you think they'd hold up in court.
SJ




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